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The price of gasoline is not subject to state regulation: so says a
Federal district court of three judges sitting in Tennessee.1 The
man with the red, blue or orange "sentry" on whom so much of
present day progress depends and the oil company behind him are
not engaged in a "public calling." The question of what is a "public
calling" or a business "affected with a public interest"2 might be
superficially dealt with by listing those businesses which have already
been declared such. It might also be resolved by the assertion that
monopoly is the test: that a business which enjoys a monopoly either
legal (as by exclusive franchise) or natural (as by geographic loca-
tion) is a public business and thereby rendered subject to govern-
mental rate regulation.
This is the rule of many cases. But it will not do as a justifica-
tion of others equally authoritative. These latter are the ones worthy
of study-the simple cases take care of tbemselves.
Of course a business does not have to :be "affected with a public
interest" in order to be subject to some regulation; any occupation
may fall under governmental control as to matters of public health,
safety, etc.3 It is when prices are involved that the question before
us is raised.
1Standard Oil Co. of La. v. Hall, Corer., 24 F. (2d) 455 (M. D. Tenn.,
1927).
'The classic phrase from Lord Hale, quoted in Muinn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113, 126 (1876).
Regulations concerning the labelling of gasoline containers (C. S. 4869)
are of this class. Obviously such a statute is evidence of a "public interest"
460 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The policy of the law is to have the necessities of life (and things
which, while not necessities, 'have come to be regarded as part of the
American standard of living) 4 available to everyone at reasonable
prices, that is, prices which yield only a fair commercial profit to the
seller. As to most things, prices are supposed to be kept within
bounds 'by the beneficient influences of competition. If they are so
controlled in fact, there is no need for governmental regulation. If
they are not, then some type of governmental interference looms up
as the solution. It is evident that in cases of franchise or natural
monopoly,5 competitive influences are lacking or restricted. There-
fore these are the simplest cases for state rate regulation, the ones
concerning which there is no dispute and the ones which furnished
the monopoly test, inadequate, but most often advanced. 6 There is a
third kind of monopoly which also prevents the natural drift of prices
to reasonable levels; it is artifical combination of otherwise competi-
tive groups. The law has dealt with this condition too,-not -by regu-
lating the rates of the combination, (since its exorbitant charges are
not considered inherent in the business itself) but by criminal prose-
cution and dissolution proceedings to, restore the natural state of
affairs, i.e. by anti-trust laws.7
Finally there are some fields of human enterprise wherein for
some reason not always clear or easy to classify one party deals at a
in the conduct of the business and discredits the classification based on a tech-
nical use of the phrase in rate regulation cases. The latter involve only a
special kind of public interest.
'As to things which are luxuries pure and simple there is at present no
such policy (see, however, note 7, post) and that seems in large measure the
basis of the decision in Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927)
holding unconstitutional by a divided court a statute fixing the maximum resale
price for theater tickets. Approved in 13 Va. L. Rev. 554; strongly disap-
proved in 25 Mich. L. Rev. 880. It has been urged that the charges of middle-
men might be subject to regulation even when the original producers' price
might not. Dissent of Mr. Justice Stone in Tyson Case; 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 778.
'Franchise monopolies: Railroads, Telephone and Telegraph Companies,
Gas and Electric Companies, the enterprises commonly called public utilities.
Natural monopolies: Grain warehouses situated in a strategic position, Munn v.
Illinois. supra, note 2. Regulation was subsequently sustained as to ware-
houses not so monopolistically situated, Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391,
14 Sup. Ct. 857 (1894) and consequently the monopoly test was later said
(McKenna, J., in German Alliance Ins. Case, note 8, post) to have been
abandoned. R~ailroads classified above as franchise monopolies have also cer-
tain elements of natural monopolies since the amount of capital required to
build one and its immobility when invested deter ready competition.
'See Wyman, 17 Harv. L. Rev. 156, 166.
'Standard Oil and Tobacco Cases, 221 U. S. I and 110, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 and
632 (1911). Combinations may be unlawful even though they do not relate to
necessities or even articles of much public importance.
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disadvantage with the other; wherein the evils of monopoly seem to
be present though monopoly itself cannot be found; wherein for ex-
ample, well informed sellers offer standardized contracts to poorly
informed buyers and terms are largely the will of one side.
Out of such conditions came the fire insurance rate regulation
statute of Kansas, and because of such conditions it was sustained
in the United States Supreme Court.8 Out of such conditions might
also come regulation of rates in some vast industries against which
the government has tried so far only the expedients of anti-trust
prosecution under the possibly mistaken view either (1) that the
advantage possessed by such concerns over the public was due en-
tirely to unlawful and preventable "artificial" combination rather
than to a natural economic tendency to deal in large units, or (2) that
dissolution would, really produce the desired results by restoring
competition between the units.9
The instant case concerning price control of gasoline seems likely
to be sustained. Natural conditions in the oil industry may not be
such today as to produce inequality in bargaining between producer
and buyer, though at least two other legislative bodies were moved to
take defensive steps. 10 But the validity of such state action should
be tested by the actual conditions and not by some supposedly suf-
ficient rule about virtual monopoly. It was because the late Circuit
'German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, Kans. Supt. of Ins., 233 U. S. 389,
34 Supt. Ct. 612 (1914). See also State v. Harty, 278 Mo. 685, 213 S. W. 443
(1919) ; People v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 252 Ill. 398, 96 N. E. 1049 (1911)
Freund, Police Power, 388.
'The fallacy of this belief might be either (1) in assuming that competition
will invariably protect the public (see "The Field of Government Price Con-
trol," 35 Yale L. J. 438) or, (2) in assuming that competition is really restored
by enacting or decreeing that it shall be. For example, the Chicago theater
ticket scalpers ordinance is considered by one -writer (13 Va. L. Rev. 554, 563,
footnote 39) to be an effective and proper manner of protecting the public
but it is elsewhere (36 Yale L. J. 985, 986) charged with failure to cure the
evil. The dissolution of the Standard Oil Company (note 7, supra) is popu-
larly supposed to have accomplished well nigh nothing.
"South Dakota in 1925 provided for state marketing of gasoline in com-
petition with private companies in order to secure reasonable prices to its
people. The act was held unconstitutional on a rather narrow ground which
left the present question open. White Eagle Oil & Refin. Co. v. Gunderson,
Governor, 205 N. W. 615 (1925). If the object of state competition is regu-
lation of rates it would seem that the necessity and justification for such gov-
ernmental enterprise would be the same as for regulation directly by price
fixing, although state enterprise frequently has a different object and is there-
fore justifiable on other grounds, as e.g., charity, where the object is to supply
some public need free or below reasonable commercial figures. See 27 Yale
L. J. 824; 21 Mich. L. Rev. 455; Green v. Frazer, 253 U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct.
499 (1920). The City of Lincoln gasoline selling ordinance was sustained by
the state court (114 Neb. 243, 207 N. W. 172, 208 N. W. 964) and by the
U. S. Supreme Court in 48 Sup. Ct. 155.
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Judge Baker was unwilling to be bound by an arbitrary test and in-
sisted, as he usually did, on considering existing conditions that he
and his brethren on the federal bench in Indiana sustained a wartime
state regulation of coal prices.1'
M. S. BRECKENRIDGE.
ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL CONFESSION TO SPIRITUAL
ADVISER
The case of State v. Alma Petty Gatlin, tried before Judge
Cameron McRae at a Special Term of the Superior Court of Rock-
ingham County last February, aroused the interest of the public
generally by its sensationalism; it is of peculiar interest to the pro-
fession-for the first iime in North Carolina the question of the
admissibility of a confidential confession as evidence was squarely
raised. The case itself will not go before the Supreme Court; Mrs.
Gatlin was acquitted. The question, therefore, remains unsettled.
There is one point to be borne in mind in considering these cases;
whether the minister may be compelled to testify is quite a different
question from whether the matter secured from the confidential con-
fession is admissable as evidence.
HISTORY OF THE QUESTION
Is a confidential comunication to a minister, priest or spiritual
adviser admissible as evidence? The question is, at least, as old as
the Roman Law of an early period. In Rome not only were such
communications excepted from evidence, but the priest who revealed
them was punished, even where he had sworn not to reveal the in-
formation. The theory was that the communication passed through
"Am. Coal Mining Co. v. Special Comn., 268 Fed. 563 (D. Ind. 1920), ap-
peal dismissed on company's motion, 258 U. S. 632, 42 S. Ct. 273. See notes
19 Mich. L. Rev. 74, 415; Simpson, "Due Process and Coal Price Regulation,"
9 Iowa L. Bull. 145 (1924); People v. United Mine Workers, 201 Pac. 55
(Colo., 1921). Even by this broad rule there would be no foundation for gen-
eral price regulation such as attempted but overthrown in Montana. Holter
Hdwe. Co. v. Boyle, 263 Fed. 134 (D. Mont., 1920). See Slate v. Goldstein,
93 So. 308 (Ala. App., 1922); Territory v. McCandless, 24Hawaii, 485 (1918).
And it is hard to see what caused the United States Supreme Court in one
case to permit an inference of approving state regulation of laundry rates.
Okla. Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331, 40 Sup. Ct. 338 (1920). Rent
regulation was sustained as an emergency measure during the war. Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 158 (1921) ; Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264
U. S. 543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405 (1924); cf. State v. R. R. Coun., 183 N. W. 687
(1921) wherein the Wisconsin Act was held invalid because of being applicable
only to Milwaukee; Rumbo v. Winterroud, 228 S. W. 258 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1921) holding invalid statute which prohibifed farm landlord taking more than
certain percent of produce as rent.
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the representative to the principal, God, and that the priest could
lawfully and rightfully swear that he knew nothing of it.' During
the Middle Ages the laws on the Continent prohibited the priest from
revealing such confessions; especially are the Capitularies of the
French kings to be noted here.2 In England, however, in the days
of King Ethelred the law seemed to recognize no distinction between
laymen and clergymen ;3 probably the effect of early Roman Law in
England had worn off and the strong Roman Catholic movement had
not yet begun. In those days the rising monarchy was reflecting in
the laws its growing power, and it was probably due to this fact
that, in the case of high treason, if we may rely upon early dicta, the
courts first mentioned a rule denying the privilege and upholding the
admissibility of confidential confessions as evidence.4 However, we
can speak with no certainty of the state of the law before the Ref-
ormation. 5 Even after the Reformation cases in point are rare, but
dicta upon the subject become more frequent.0 By 1802, in a case
squarely in point, the court felt so sure of the ground that it began
the decision with these words, "There is no difficulty in this case
. . ."17 By 1860 a priest had been fined for contempt because of
his refusal to testify as to a confession ;8 this decision seems to have
'Mascardus, De Probat., Vol. I, Quaest. 5, n. 61 [also see Greenleaf, Evi-
dence, Vol I, sect. 247 (13th edition)].
' Capit. Reg. Francorum, lib. 7, paragraph 118; Leges Barbar. Antiq., Vol.
III, pp. 313, 316.3 Ancient Laws and Institutes of England, Vol. 1, p. 347; Peake, Evidence,
Am. from the 5th London edition, p. 253; Best, Evidence, paragraph 583, 584.
' Note to Reg. v. Hay, 2 Fost. & F. (Eng.) 4 (1860).
'Garnett's Trial, 2 How. St. Tr. 218, 255 (1606). The famous Gunpowder
Plot Case is the one here cited; Garnett was implicated,-and executed. Ap-
parently, all that could be found against the Jesuit priest was that he refused
to tell confessions made to him.
'Anon., 2 Skinner, 404 per Holt, C. J. (1693) ; Du Barre v. Livette, Peake's
Case 77, citing Reg. v. Sparks (1701) ; Wilson v. Ralstall, 4 T. R. 753, 759,
dicta by Buller, J. (1792) ; Broad v. Pitt, 3 C. & P. 518, dicta by Best, C. J.
(1828) ; Best, C. J., claimed the law was settled by a prior case, Reg. v. Gil-
ham, but this case did not raise the question. He placed his reliance then, not
upon a case, but upon dicta. Reg. v. Gilham, Moody Cr. C. 186 (1828).
'Butler v. Moore, Rolls, Ireland, 24 Feb. (1802). One of the earliest
cases squarely in point, which has been fully reported. There the Roman
Catholic priest objected to testifying as to information secured at a death-bed
confession. Held, that "every man is bound to make discovery unless spe-
cially protected by law . . . candidly admitted here . . . that no special ex-
emption could be shown in this case." Cited Vaillant v. Dodeinond, 2 Atkyns,
524.8 Reg. v. Hay, supra, n. 4. Years later it was said, in a case in which a
vicar was compelled to testify, that it was "not to be supposed for a moment
that a clergyman had the right to withold information from a court of law."
Nortnanshaw v. Normanshaw, 69 L. T. N. S. 468 (1893). Even earlier, though,
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gone to the limit. But-the law could not have been settled, for
only seven years before, Baron Alderson considered that the law
favored the privilege and decided against the admissibility of a con-
fidential confession to a minister. He cited no cases, however, and
rendered the decision, it would seem, upon an analogy only.0 As
late as 1890 Coleridge, C. J., told of having argued for the privilege,
but even he had his doubts upon the state of the law; he was mis-
taken at least, in his belief that the question had never arisen in
Ireland, 10 if not also in his belief concerning the law here discussed.
In the United States we followed, from an early date, what was
apparently the stronger view at common law, that there was no privi-
lege, 1 but this fact seems to have been overlooked by some leading
commentators. 12 The common law cases in the United States are
rare; the reports of recent years reveal but two cases, both of them
from New Jersey; both of these admitted the information secured
by communication to the spiritual adviser.18 More than half of the
states have protected the privilege by statute.14 But these statutes
have been construed strictly;1r5 on the face of the decisions such
we find the dicta that the privilege was recognized in Catholic countries, but
"not recognized in England." Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia, L. R.
2 Ch. Div. 644 (1876), 35 L. T. N. S. 76.
'Reg. v. Griffin, 6 Cox C. Cr. 219 (1853). Baron Alderson decided this
case on principle, not authority. He suggested the analogy to the lawyer-
client relation; he refused, however, to lay down his decision as "an absolute
rule". Counsel pressed the point no further.
"0Life and Correspondence, Vol. II, 364 (1904). A letter from Coleridge,
C. 3., to Mr. Gladstone. Butler v. Moore, supra, n. 7, was an Irish case.C Priest excused from testifying, when he objected. People v. Phillips, I
West, L. J. (N. Y.) 109 (1813). This case was supported by (it did not cite)
Dicta in Broad v. Pitt, supra, no. 6; dicta in Reg. v. Hay, supra, no. 4; de-
cision in Reg. v. Griffin, supra, n. 9. Minister allowed to testify when he
wished to do so. Sinith's Case, 2 N. Y. City Hall Rec. 77 (1817). This case,
we observe, follows. Broad v. Pitt, supra, n. 6. Reg. v. Gilham, supra, n. 6.
"Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. 5, paragraph 2394 (second edition); Underhill,
Criminal Evidence, paragraph 295 (third edition).
" Information given priest at confessional, held admissable. Bahrey v.
Poniatishin, 112 Atl. 481 (1921 N. J.). Information confidentially given a
Salvation Army major as spiritual adviser, held admissable and "not privi-
leged." State v. Morehouse, 117 Atl. 296 (1922 N. J.)
" California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Wis-
consin. Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washing-
ton, Wyoming, Indiana, Kentucky, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Okla-
homa, South Dakota, Vermont, Porto Rico, Philippine Islands, Alaska.
"Communications must arise under confessional supported by the discipline
of the church. People v. Gates, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 311 (1835).
Minister must be in his professional capacity. State v. Morgan, 196 Mo.
177, 35 S. W. 402 (1906).
Must be confessions of sin only. Gilhoole, v. State, 58 Ind. 182 (1877)
Hill v. State, 61 Neb. 589, 85 N. W. 836 (19017).
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strict interpretation implies that the courts, generally, consider that
these statutes have changed the common law and have recognized a
new exception to the general principles of admissibility. This further




The objection to the statutes usually involves their constitution-
ality. The Constitution of North Carolina (and of other states)
guarantees the right to worship God "according to the dictates of
their own consciences."16 But the statutes apply alike to the fol-
lowers of all creeds; they protect no particular religion; they en-
courage men to go to their ministers, confess their sins, admit
their spiritual bankruptcy, and begin anew to live honestly and hon-
orably; they assure penitents freedom in yielding to their con-
sciences. More than a score of the states have denied the validity of
this constitutional objection, though there is at least subtlety in the
suggestion that ministers should be just as free to yield to their
consciences and notify the police as criminals are to yield to theirs
and confess to ministers. Law finds no difficulty in forbidding doc-
tors and lawyers from committing breaches of confidence; if law
can protect one fiduciary relation, it has power to protect another
by express legislative enactment.
Social Policy
The most forceful objection to the protection of the privilege is
that it throws a veil around the wrongdoer, and that, whether it be
the best policy or not, so long as the theory of our law is that every
wrong should be punished, no obstacle should be placed in the way
of the prosecution of wrongdoers. Confession, "the queen of
proofs," (Enrico Ferri) is certainly "best evidence." Any claim that
the matter is privileged should have the burden of proving its justi-
fication, for it may well be argued that public policy is against pro-
Confessor must be a member of the clergyman church. Alford v. Johnson,
103 Ark. 236, 146 S. W. 516 (1912) ; State v. Morgan, supra.
Confession must be-of a private and confidental nature. Milburn v. Ha-
worth, 47 Colorado 593, 108 Pac. 155 (1910).
Of a penitential character, made in obedience to some supposed religious
duty. Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201 (1881).
Not a mere justification of his acts. State v. Brown, 95 Iowa 381, 64 N. W.
277 (1895).
"Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. 5, paragraph 2395 (second edition). Ample
justification for the statutes is shown.
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tecting a confessed wrongdoer. Ethically, it might be claimed that a
denial of the privilege invites breaches of confidence; the layman
abhors the idea of a minister listening sympathetically to a confession
only to turn upon a confiding penitent, announce his wrong to the
world, and hand him over into the clutches of the law. A Catholic,
firmly wedded to his confessional, and protected in his freedom to
worship God as he pleases, would no doubt revolt at the idea of the
Father Confessor publishing to the world his sins of the month.
But law regards the law of the land as a duty higher than the moral
duty arising out of friendship and sympathy; friends are frequently
called upon to testify against friends and even the bonds of family
kinship are sometimes broken in the vigorous prosecution of those
who have broken the laws of the land.
Sociologically, the privilege might be defended because it tends
to encourage men to yield to their better natures, confess their past
errors, and reform. But sociology is also interested in deterring law-
breaking; if we provide a way by which men may relieve themselves
of the compulsions to confess, a very important factor in the detec-
tion of crime will have been destroyed. Psychologically, where the
privilege is protected, this enables the criminal to find release for
suppressed fears and inhibited worries by confessing to a minister.
The minister having given the assurance of divine forgiveness, it
would appear that we would have fewer confessions to the police
and other authorities and, therefore, more of the wrongdoers would
go unpunished, for once the compulsion to confess has found an
outlet, there would be no "drive" operating in the criminal's mind
tending to force him to confess.
The common law cases show considerable conflict, but His Honor,
Judge McRae, was clearly justified in admitting the testimony,
though he could have found ample authority to support a contrary
opinion. The numerous American statutes point to a tendency away
from the "common law" view toward a recognition of the privilege.
D. S. GARDNER.
WHEN IS A CHECK PAID-LIABILITY OF COLLECTING AGENT
It is universally conceded that a check given in payment of a debt
in the ordinary course of business does not discharge the debt until it
be paid, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. In a recent
North Carolina case' the plaintiff in suing to enjoin the sale of his
'Litchfield v. Reid, 195 N. C. 161, 141 S. E. 543 (1928).
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land for taxes pleaded payment and offered in evidence his cancelled
check which had been endorsed by the tax collector, stamped "paid"
by the drawee bank, and charged to plaintiff's account. On the
same day that the drawee bank cancelled the check and charged it to
plaintiff's account that bank became insolvent. If anything further
was done in the way of payment such did not appear on the record.
It was shown that the payee got nothing. The trial judge ruled for
the defendant tax collector as a matter of law. Held-Error. The
issue of payment should have gone to the jury since the plaintiff had
sustained his burden of showing payment.
In the instant case the question resolved itself into whether the
drawer of the check was discharged. If the check was paid his debt
was discharged. Since no point was made of the matter in the opin-
ion it must be taken that the insolvency of the drawee bank took
place after the check was cancelled and charged to plaintiff's account.
If the contrary had been true there would have been no payment in
this case because it is certain that cash was not paid, which means
that the bank had done no more than assume the debt, and such
assumption by an insolvent drawee could not discharge the drawer.
2
However, cash payment of a check by an insolvent bank to one inno-
cent of the insolvency would be irrevocable.
3
Assuming solvency at the time the check reaches the drawee bank
the question arises as to just when payment takes place. It would
hardly be possible to fix upon a point of time that would fit every
case. As a general proposition it has been said that payment of
checks received through the mail or handled through the clearing
house occurs at that physical point of time when the drawer's account
is charged with the amount of the check. 4 Now charging the drawer's
account and cancelling the check is not the exact equivalent of an
acceptance by the drawee bank but it does make that bank liable on
'Exchange Bank of Wheeling v. Sutton, 78 Md. 577, 28 Atl. 563, 23 L. R. A.
173 (1894).
'Hayes v. Beardsley, 136 N. Y. 299, 32 N. E. 855 (1892).
" It is suggested in Paton's Digest that as to checks sent through the clear-
ing house or by mail for payment the physical time of payment is "the point
of time when the check is actually charged to the drawer's account." Paton's
Digest, Vol. II, p. 1389. In Massachusetts it has been held that where a bank
under an agreement to pay the notes of a depositor received one for payment,
marked it paid, and made out a remittance check for the amount just before
it was informed of the depositor's insolvency, such constituted payment even
though no changes had been made on the books of the bank. Nineteenth Ward
Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 184 Mass. 49, 67 N. E. 670 (1903).
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the indebtedness. 5 Up to that point, however, without more, the
drawer is not discharged because the owner of the check or his agent
has not accepted the credit of the drawee bank in preference to that
of the drawer and nothing has passed to the owner of the check. If
such owner accepts either a credit with the drawee bank, its ac-
ceptance or certification of the check, or its paper in lieu of the
check, the drawer is normally discharged because the owner of the
check has a right to payment in cash and accepts anything other than
cash at his own risk.0 But it is in the more common case involving
collecting agents that the trouble arises. A consideration of that
angle of the problem follows herein.
The mere fact that a check has been marked "paid" in the cus-
tomary manner, without more, simply raises a rebuttable presumption
of payment.7 It seems more logical for a drawee bank to mark a
check paid after it has been charged to the drawer rather than before
but the inverse order has been followed by some banks. 8 Where
this practice is followed there are more likely to be facts to rebut the
presumption of payment. In the North Carolina case under consid-
eration the check had been charged to the drawer's account as well
as cancelled. Though it did not appear what disposition, if any, had
been made of the amount charged to the drawer, in the words of the
court, "upon the facts shown by the evidence plaintiff has no con-
cern as to such disposition." The court thought that a jury might
"Acceptance by the drawee bank discharges the drawer. See Lipten v.
Columbia Trust Co., 185 N. Y. Supp. 198, 194 App. Div. 384 (1920). Merely
stamping the check "paid" does not amount to an acceptance. Hunt v. Security
State Bank, 91 Ore. 362, 179 Pac. 248 (1919). Checks are normally presented
for payment and not certification so the mere marking a check "paid" without
more does not indicate an intent to become bound on the instrument as an
acceptor. Where the drawee bank is also an agent for collection of the check
it has been held that there can be no acceptance until the check is charged to
the account of the drawer and credited to the account of the remitting bank.
First Nat. Bank of Murfreesboro v. First Nat. Bank of Nashville, 127 Tenn.
205, 154 S. W. 965 (1913). Under the N. I. L., sec. 187, the certification of a
check is made the equivalent of an acceptance.
" See Cleve v. Craven Chemical Co., 18 Fed. (2d) 711 (1927).
'"In the absence of other evidence a paid check drawn to payee or order is
prima facie a receipt from the payee to the drawer. It is not conclusive but
is open to explanation or denial." Patterson v. Bank of Humboldt, 73 Neb.
384, 102 N. W. 765 (1905). It is the general rule that possession of an in-
strument by the obligor after maturity raises a presumption of payment. Vann
v. Edwards, 130 N. C. 70, 40 S. E. 853 (1902) ; Poston v. Jones, 122 N. C.
536, 29 S. E. 951 (1898). That the drawee bank marked a check "paid,"
debited the drawer's account, and sent him the cancelled check is a stronger
case for such a presumption. Since payment is a matter of fact such a pre-
sumption is always a rebuttable one.
'First Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, supra, note 5, is a case illustrative of
this practice.
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have found from the evidence that the drawee bank had paid the
holder of the check. But assuming that the drawee bank had done
nothing further than cancel the check and charged the drawer's ac-
count, would that have discharged the latter? As already suggested,
it is the writer's opinion that it would not have done so, because the
process of payment would not be complete even as to the drawer until
something in the form of credit or otherwise had passed to the
holder of the check.
The drawer of a check is discharged if he has sustained any loss
by reason of a want of due diligence on the part of his creditor in
presenting the check for payment. 9
Unless the check is drawn on a local bank it is necessary, of
course, to collect it through collecting agents. The cases do not
make it clear just what effect this factor has upon the problem as to
payment of checks. In spite of the universal practice among banks
to make payment in exchange or by keeping mutual accounts with
correspondent banks, the common law rule that in the absence of
special authorization an agent for collection may accept cash and that
only in payment of the debts of his principal still prevails. It is
applicable to banks that are acting as agents for the collection of
checks.' 0
There are two lines of decisions as to the liability of collecting
banks. Under the so-called New York rule, followed by the Federal
courts, the original agent is held absolutely liable for the defaults of
his sub-agents as an independent contractor for collection while the
sub-agents are deemed not to be in privity with the principal, so not
responsible to him." But under the Massachusetts rule the original
agent may be held responsible for his own defaults, which includes
negligence in selecting sub-agents, and the sub-agents are deemed
directly responsible to the principal for their defaults as such. 12 The
'Kilpatrick v. Home Building and Loan Ass'n., 119 Pa. 30, 12 Atl. 754
(1888). And see note to Dille v. White, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 541. But if the
drawer has not been injured .by such want of diligence he is not thereby dis-
charged. Bull v. Bank of Kasson, 123 U. S. 105 (1887). It has been held in
North Carolina where a debtor had given a cashier's check in payment which
check reached the drawee bank after it had closed its doors due to the negli-
gence of the creditor that the debtor was thereby discharged. Federal Land
Bank of Columbia v. Barrow, 189 N. C. 303, 127 S. E. 3 (1925).
"0Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 160, 44 Sup. Ct. 196, 68 L.
Ed. 617, 31 A. L. R. 1261 (1923).
"Hammerberg v. State Bank of Slayton, 212 N. W. (Minn.) 16 (1927);
First Nat. Bank of Denver v. Fed. Res. Bank of Kansas City, 6 Fed. (2d)
339 (1925) ; and see the collection of cases in 13 Cal. L. Rev. 231, at p. 232.
"See collection of cases in 13 Cal. L. Rev. 231, at p. 233.
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North Carolina court follows the latter rule.13 It is thus the one
accepted for the purposes of this discussion.
Suppose the collecting agent accepts the draft of the drawee bank
for the check. Unless the draft was expressly taken in final pay-
ment the receipt of it is only conditional payment as to the drawee
bank and such bank would still be liable if the draft were dishonored.
If the draft is to be deemed as taken in conditional payment is the
drawer of the check thereby discharged? He would not be discharged
if he had assented to such conditional payment 14 but in the normal
case he is not in a position to give such assent save in advance. An
agent for collection may, unless forbidden, accept a check from the
debtor himself in conditional payment. 15 The question now is
whether he may so accept the draft of the debtor's drawee in pay-
ment of the former's check. In a late North Carolina case it was
held, without mention of the factor of conditional payment, that
where the collecting agent takes the drawee bank's draft for the
check the payee's right to have cash is thereby waived and the
drawer discharged.1 6 The solution seems to be that the drawee's
payment to the agent with a draft is not conditional payment at all
as to the drawer but final payment. It. is treated as conditional here
in the sense that the drawee is still liable on the draft in case it is
dishonored. Since the drawer is discharged by such payment by the
drawee it would be only a fair protection to the payee to hold that
the collecting agent accepts such payment at his own risk. Notwith-
standing such a holding custom may be strong enough to permit a
collecting agent to accept the drawee's draft in payment of a check
without thereby incurring liability,17 though it has been held that
such usage is unreasonable.18 It appears then that such factors may
modify the question of the liability of a collecting bank for accepting
something other than cash in payment.
The North Carolina Code of 1927, sec. 220 (aa) gives drawee
banks the option to pay all checks drawn on them in exchange, unless
"2 Mechem, Agency, 2d ed. (1914), p. 685.
"Farmers', etc. Bank v. Union Nat. Bank, 42 N. D. 449, 173 N. W. 789
(1919). See also Barnes v. Trust Co., 194 N. C. 371, 139 S. E. 689 (1927).
"Bank v. Floyd, 142 N. C. 187, 55 S. E. 95 (1906).
"Dewey v. Margolis, 195 N. C. 307, 142 S. E. 22 (1928). Accord, Palmer
v. Harrison, 141 S. E. 276 (Ga., 1928).
124 Col. L. Rev. 903. For such a custom or usage to be binding it is not
necessary that the principal have actual knowledge thereof. Hilsinger v.
Trickett, 86 Ohio State 286, 99 N. E. 305 (1912).
'Nat. Bank of Commerce v. American Exch. Bank, 151 Mo. 320, 52 S. W.
265 (1899).
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it be specified thereon to the contrary, "when any such check is pre-
sented by or through any Federal Reserve Bank, Post Office, or
Express Co., or any respective agent thereof."' 9  This statute does
not relieve a drawee bank from liability merely upon its giving ex-
change but leaves it still liable under such circumstances until its
exchange draft is paid.20 Its effect is, if not to modify the common
law rule that an agent for collection can accept only cash in payment
of the debt owing his principle, certainly to limit the operation of
that rule in North Carolina to the extent of the option granted. And
it has been held under this statute that it is not negligence for a
Federal Reserve Bank to accept exchange instead of cash.21 That
decision is reasonable because under the statute the drawer who does
not specify on the check to the contrary immediately agrees that it
shall be payable in exchange. And because of this implied assent of
the drawer to payment in exchange such payment has been held not




THE TIME FOR TAKING EXCEPTION TO THE COURT'S CHARGE
Bills of exception were founded on the statute of Westminster
2d (13 Edw. 1) Ch. 31. That statute does not expressly mention at
what time the exception is to be tendered, but the reason of the
thing, the practice of the common law courts, and the precedents
and authorities on the subject, prove that it must be at the time.of
the trial.' When an exception is taken to the charge of the court, it
must be tendered 'before a verdict is rendered 'by the jury in open
court. Otherwise the exception is not available. This was the gen-
Graham v. Warehouse, 189 N. C. 533, 127 S. E. 540 (1925).
' This statute was called forth by the recent struggle between the Federal
Reserve Banks and the small non-par banks in which the former tried to
force par clearance upon the latter by presenting checks over the counter for
payment in cash. The North Carolina Legislature came to the rescue of the
small North Carolina banks involved and enacted the statute in question. The
North Carolina court held the statute unconstitutional in Farmers, etc. Bank v.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 183 N. C. 546, 112 S. E. 252 (1922), but
its decision was overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States on
appeal. 262 U. S. 649, 43 Sup. Ct. 651 (1922). For a further discussion of the
subject see C. T. Murchison, "Par Clearance of Checks," 1 N. C. L. Rev. 133
and a note 'by the same -writer in 2 N. C. L. Rev. 36. See also 37 Harv. L.
Rev. 133.
' Cleve v. Chemical Co., supra, note 6.
2Ibid.
'Morris v. Buckley, 8 S. & R. 211 (Pa., 1822).
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erally stated common law rule.2 Today the law in regard to excep-
tions is governed in the different states by statute.
The North Carolina Code8 provides that if there is error, either
in the refusal of the judge to grant a prayer for instructions, or in
granting a prayer, or in his instructions generally, the same is
deemed excepted to without the filing of any formal objections at the
trial. Exceptions of this type are taken in time when set out in the
appelant's statement of the case on appeal. 4 But exceptions for
omissions to charge in a particular way are different. If a party
thinks he is entitled to an instruction he should ask for it, and having
failed to do so, he cannot after the verdict complain, provided the
instruction given was correct.5 However if the omission is of such
vital importance that the charge given does not cover the entire case,
as required by statute,6 objections may be taken in the case on ap-
peal. 7 If there is a mistake in the judge's statement of the conten-
tions of the parties, however, objections must 'be made at the time.
If made after the verdict they are too late and deemed to have been
waived.8 There is a reason for the difference, as to time, between
the exceptions to the mistakes in the statement of the contentions
and the exceptions to errors of law. The North Carolina statutes
require the judge to charge the jury in regard to the law of the
case.9 Hence the charge to the jury is a fundamental part of the
trial. The statement of the contentions of the parties is not required
of the trial judge,10 although he is required to state the evidence in
the case to the jury." Therefore error in the statement of the con-
tentions is not a fundamental error and should be objected to at the
time.
'Gehl v. Milwaukee Produce Co., 93 N. W. 26 (Wis.. 1903).
3 C. S. 590, sub. 2; N. C. Code, sec. 412, subd. 3.
'Smith v. Smith, 108 N. C. 365, 13 S. E. 113 (1891) ; Posey v. Patton, 109
N. C. 455, 14 S. E. 654 (1891) ; Williams & Co. v. Haines, 137 N. C. 460, 49
S. E. 954 (1905) ; Schaeffer & Son v. Stone Co., 174 N. C. 781, 93 S. E. 931
(1917); Paul v. Benton, 180 N. C. 45, 108 S. E. 380 (1920).
'Shnimons v. Davenport, 140 N. C. 407, 53 S. E. 225 (1906); Sanders v.
Gilbert, 156 N. C. 463, 72 S. E. 610 (1911) ; State v. Groves, 119 N. C. 822, 25
S. E. 819 (1896) ; State v. Harris, 120 N. C. 577, 26 S. E. 774 (1897).
'C. S. 564. Patterson v. North Carolina Lumber Co., 145 N. C. 42, 58
S. E. 437 (1907) ; Hauser v. Furniture Co., 174 N. C. 463, 93 S. E. 961 (1917).
'Bowen v. Schnibben, 184 N. C. 248, 114 S. E. 170 (1922).
'State v. Johnson, 193 N. C. 701, 138 S. E. 19 (1927) ; Proctor v. Fertilizer
Co., 189 N. C. 243, 126 S. E. 608 (1925) ; Phifer v. Commissioners of Cabarrus
County, 157 N. C. 150, 72 S. E. 852 (1911).
'C. S. 564.
"'State v. Whaley, 191 N. C. 387, 132 S. E. 6 (1926).
- C. S. 564.
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In many other states the rule is different. In Massachusetts,
exceptions to the judge's charge must be taken before the jury re-
tires.1 2 The Virginia rule is similar to the Massachusetts view.13
The Texas statutes 14 provide that before the arguments and often
the evidence has been concluded, the judge shall put his charge in
writing and submit it to the parties. A reasonable time is given them
in which to examine the charge and present objections thereto, which
objections must be presented to the court before the charge is read to
the jury. All objections not so made and presented are considered
as waived.15 The rules of the Federal Courts require exceptions to
the instructions to be taken at the time and before the jury retires. 16
These conflicting rules of practice present the question whether it
is more advantageous to require exceptions to the charge to be made
before the verdict or to allow them to be made for the first time in
the case on appeal. Is the North Carolina rule the best solution of
this problem and best suited to the administration of justice?
It is argued that if exceptions be taken at the time, the judge will
be given the opportunity to change his charge'and correct the error.
But is the court likely to change his charge at the request or objec-
tion of one of the parties? This may be true as to inadvertent state-
ments in the charge; but, where the judge has spent much thought
on 'his instructions, undoubtedly he will prefer his opinion concerning
the law rather than the opinion of one of the parties. Consequently.
if this is the purpose of the statutes requiring exceptions to be made
at the time, this purpose would be accomplished only in a limited
number of cases.
Then it is contended that justice is best subserved by requiring
exceptions to be taken when the charge is given and that if the lawyer
does not know of the error at the time, it is his misfortune. Quite
Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 248 Mass.
502, 143 N. E. 312 (1924) ; Spooner v. Handley, 151 Mass. 313, 23 N. E. 840
(1890) ; Lee v. Gibbs, 10 Allen 248 (Mass., 1865).
" Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S. E. 459 (1912);
Collins v. George, 102 Va. 509, 46 S. E. 684 (1904) ; Clarke v. Sheet's Admn.,
99 Va. 381, 38 S. E. 183 (1901).
"Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, Art. 1954, 1970-1971.
'Eldridge v. Citizens Ry. Co., 169 S. W. 375 (Tex., 1914); Missouri K.
& T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Smith, 172 S. W. 750 (Tex., 1915); Consolidated
Kansas City Smelting & R. Co. v. Schulte, 176 S. W. 94 (Tex., 1915); Mc-
Lauhlin v. Terrell Bros., 179 S. W. 932 (Tex., 1915).
'.Northern Central Cool Co. v. Milburn, 205 Fed. 270 (C. C. A., 8th, 1913)
Wells Fargo Co. v. Zintiner, 186 Fed. 130 (C. C. A., 8th, 1911) ; St. Louis, L. M.
& S. -Ry. Co. v. Spencer, 71 Fed. 93 (C. C. A., 8th, 1895) ; Bracken v. Union
Pac. Ry. Co., 56 Fed. 447 (C. C. A., 8th, 1893).
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the contrary appear to be the dictates of justice. Is an entirely
erroneous result to be allowed to stand because at the particular
moment the lawyer does not know that it is error? This seems to
burden justice with technicalities. Opportunity should be given the
lawyer to review the charge and if there is error then he should be
allowed to show it.
It may be urged that there should be no distinction between excep-
tions to evidence and exceptions to the charge. It is the general rule
that exceptions to the evidence must be taken immediately, or the
objection is deemed waived. 17 Why should not this rule apply equally
to exceptions to the charge? There is a reason for this distinction.
This reason is the difference between the testimony and the charge.
Testimony is of various qualities. It may make an impression upon
the jury or it may not; it may be believed by the jury or it may not.
The jury regards the court's charge as the law of the case and their
verdicts are so influenced. An error in the admission or rejection of
testimony may not change the result, whereas an error in the charge
is a fundamental error. Hence it is right that exceptions to the
charge should not be governed by the strict requirements which gov-
ern the exceptions to the testimony.
The taking of exceptions when the charge is given tends to inter-
rupt the procedure of the court and cause confusion. Often very
lengthy exceptions are taken to the charge. If these would have to
be argued and reviewed by the trial judge considerable time would be
taken up, thus greatly delaying the transactions of business of the
court not only in that case but in others to follow.
By following the North Carolina rules of practice, therefore,
justice is more nearly attained, and this after all is the fundamental
purpose of all rules of practice.
W. A. DEVIN, JR.
Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408 (1892); Lee v. Methodist
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